Plaintiff, formerly Assistant Director of the Pennsylvania Lottery (“Lottery”), alleges that during the course of her employment she was discriminated against because of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also alleges that she was ultimately discharged in retaliation for the claim of discrimination she filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and that the discharge thus violated Title VII and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and venue is proper. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, which has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
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Judge Yvette Kane
Judge Malachy E. Mannion
The general facts in this case are not in dispute. On December 30, 1998, the plaintiff was sledding at Skytop Lodge when he ran into an orange plastic fence which had been placed at the bottom of the hill by Skytop to keep sledders from traveling out onto a lake at the bottom of the sledding hill. On his third run, the plaintiff came in contact with the fence causing him to break his right leg between the ankle and the knee.
The general facts in this case are not in dispute. On December 30, 1998, the plaintiff was sledding at Skytop Lodge when he ran into an orange plastic fence which had been placed at the bottom of the hill by Skytop to keep sledders from traveling out onto a lake at the bottom of the sledding hill. On his third run, the plaintiff came in contact with the fence causing him to break his right leg between the ankle and the knee.
Judge Raymond J. Durkin on September 21, 1999. (Doc. No. 12) This action arose out of a fire that occurred on January 20, 1999 at 25-26 Pugh Street, Edwardsville, Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs, Anthony and Henrietta Valenti, were the owners of a rental property located at the above mentioned address. They were insured by the Allstate Insurance Company for fire damage under Insurance Policy No. 098095949. The policy was in effect on the date of the fire which destroyed the building. Following the fire, the plaintiffs submitted a claim for property damage to the Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate denied the claim.
The fire was an arson, a fact not disputed by any of the parties. The defendant, however, claimed that Anthony Valenti was responsible for an intentional act of arson on the property. Therefore, pursuant to an exclusion in the policy, Allstate claimed that plaintiffs were not entitled to any compensation under its policy. Further, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs made false and fraudulent representations in the presentation of their claim to Allstate.
On October 5, 2001, the plaintiff filed an “Action in Mortgage Foreclosure” against the defendant. (Doc. No. 1). Thereafter on November 27, 2001, plaintiff filed a “Motion For Special Service Pursuant To Special Order Of Court.” (Doc. No. 3). The request was made because of plaintiff’s apparent inability to serve the defendant with a copy of the complaint.
Judge Sylvia H. Rambo
This case is a habeas corpus petition brought by Hatim Muhammad against Warden Jake Mendez of the United States Penitentiary at Allenwood in White Deer, Pennsylvania and the United States Parole Commission (“Commission”) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner raises various procedural due process violations regarding his initial parole hearing on April 26, 2000 and challenges the Commission’s decision to depart from the guideline ranges for setting a reconsideration hearing. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. Because Petitioner relies upon inapplicable federal parole statutes and the Commission did not abuse its discretion in departing from the guideline ranges, Muhammad’s petition will be denied.
Plaintiffs Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendant Executive Officers, and Defen dant P residing Officers. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the enactment of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1200 (“Act 1”), Pennsylvania’s Congressional redistricting plan, which Governor Schweiker signed into law on January 7, 2002.
In our previous order of February 22, 2002, we dismissed several claims brought by the Plaintiffs which challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1200 (Act 1), the congressional redistricting plan enacted by the General Assembly and signed into law on January 7, 2002. On March 11-12, 2002, we held a hearing on the Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim: Act 1 violates the constitutional principle of “one-person, one vote.” Upon conclusion of this hearing, we ordered the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Plaintiffs Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendant Executive Officers, and Defendant Presiding Officers. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the enactment of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1200 (“Act 1”), Pennsylvania’s Congressional redistricting plan, which Governor Schweiker signed into law on January 7, 2002.
This case is before the Court for consideration of Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt’s Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 10), concerning Reginald Reaves petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2241, (Doc. 1). The Magistrate Judge recommends that this Court dismiss Petitioner’s habeas corpus action. (Doc. 10 at 8.) Petitioner has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 13), and Respondent has filed a brief opposing Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. 14). Therefore, we will review the matter de novo. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
In an independent action in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Thomas Smith, a passenger, received a verdict against Mark Hartung, the driver of an automobile owned by Deborah Palma.
In this case, a declaratory judgment action, Defendant CGU (the insurer of Deborah Palma) asks the Court to declare it is not responsible to pay the verdict amount to Thomas Smith because Mark Hartung did not have permission to use the automobile of Deborah Palma.
As discussed fully herein, we find Thomas Smith cannot prove that Mark Hartung had permission to use the automobile. We will, therefore, grant the Defendant, CGU’s request, and declare it is not responsible to pay the verdict amount to the Plaintiff, Thomas Smith.