The plaintiff commenced this action on September 21, 2005, by filing her complaint. (Doc. No. 1.) In the complaint, the plaintiff accuses the defendant of disability-based discrimination and related offenses. She raises six counts. First, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2006)), by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability even though she would have been able to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Second, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006)), by failing to advise her of her rights under the FMLA while she was on protected leave. Third, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against her because of her exercising of her rights under the ADA and FMLA. Fourth, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (“PHRA”), Pub. L. No. 744, Pa. Laws 222 (codified as amended at 43 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 2006)), by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability even though she would have been able to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Fifth, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against her by terminating her for filing a claim under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act of 1915 (“WCA”), Pub. L. No. 736, Pa. Laws 338 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1 et seq. (West 2006)). Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA”), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)),1 by taking an adverse employment action against her because she was pregnant.
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Judge Malachy E. Mannion
The plaintiff, formerly an inmate at the Allenwood Low Security Correctional Institution (“LSCI Allenwood”) in White Deer, Pennsylvania, commenced this action on December 8, 2004, by filing a complaint against Susan Gerlinski, warden of LSCI Allenwood, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and the United States of America. The action was brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (Doc. No. 1.) Since the filing of the action, the plaintiff has been deported to his native Columbia.
Presently before the court is a “MOTION FOR THE UNSEALING OF AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT AND THE UNSEALING OF THE APPLICATION AND RELATED DOCUMENTS FOR SEALING OF AFFIDAVIT, RETURN OF PROPERTY AND REQUEST FOR HEARING,” (Doc. No. 6), filed on behalf of the Scranton Housing Authority.
On July 26, 2004, the plaintiff, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, (“SCI-Mahanoy”), Frackville, Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, in which he alleges that defendant Hopta violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unsafe conditions in the prison’s welding shop and that defendant Cerullo was deliberately indifferent to his resulting medical needs.
On October 26, 2001, the plaintiff initiated the instant action in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas as the result of the tragic suicide of her daughter, Deborah Cruise, in a Scranton Police Department holding cell. The plaintiff alleges that her daughter’s civil rights were violated, during her detention for public drunkenness and disorderly conduct, by members of the Scranton Police Department. In addition, the plaintiff raises state law wrongful death and survivor claims.
The petitioner, an inmate incarcerated at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Dallas (“SCI-Dallas”), Pennsylvania, filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June 14, 2004, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1). The petitioner alleges that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Parole Board”) changed its policies and procedures in 1996 in such a way as to apply unconstitutionally stringent standards for granting parole. He claims that these changes violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution
The plaintiff initiated the instant civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 9, 2004, in which he named only the State Police Defendants. (Doc. No. 1). By order dated October 6, 2004, the plaintiff was permitted to file an amended complaint adding defendants Tafton Fire Company, Inc. and Carrick1. (Doc. Nos. 16 & 17). On October 21, 2004, the State Police Defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff’s amended complaint.
On April 25, 2003, the plaintiffs initiated the instant action in which they seek a declaratory judgment to order the defendant to: (1) allow them to backfill mine pits on a certain tract of land known as the “Bliss tract” located in Cherry Township, Sullivan County, Pennsylvania, with fly-ash material; and (2) grant its consent to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, (“DEP”), Bureau of Mining and Reclamation, for this procedure.
In 1990 the petitioner was convicted on two charges of rape, and sentenced to 10 to 20 years incarceration. His minimum sentence was served as of September 13, 2000, and his maximum sentence is due to expire on September 13, 2010. (Doc. No. 31, Declaration of Benjamin A. Martinez, Chairman, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Martinez Decl.”), ¶ 23). The Parole Board interviewed the petitioner for parole consideration on three occasions: June 2000, June 2003 and June 2004. Before each interview the petitioner was advised by Department of Corrections staff who evaluated him that they were recommending that he not be granted parole due to, among other things, his refusal to participate in a sex offender program
On May 2, 1995, the petitioner pled guilty to 3 counts of criminal homicide, 1 count of burglary, and 2 counts of theft by unlawful taking. Subsequent to the plea colloquy, he was sentenced on the same date to 3 consecutive life imprisonment terms on the homicide counts; 10 to 20 years imprisonment on the burglary charge, to run consecutively to the 3 life terms, and 2 terms of 3 ½ to 7 years imprisonment on the theft by unlawful taking charges, also to run consecutively to the other terms.
On May 9, 1995, the petitioner wrote to his court appointed attorney, and advised him that he wished to file a Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, and a direct appeal, and that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. Counsel replied that he would not take any further action on the matter because the petitioner had waived his right to withdraw his guilty plea as part of the plea bargain.