Opinions

The Middle District of Pennsylvania offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2012, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

02/28/2007

  • 3:05-CV-2280 US INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE v. WHITE
    File:

    Presently before the Court is an appeal from an order issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in the above-entitled matter. For the reasons stated below, the order of the Bankruptcy Court will be modified and Appellant’s motion requesting relief from the automatic stay will be granted. Appellant will be permitted to setoff the entire amount of the Appellees’ 2003 income tax refund against Appellees’ prior tax liabilities.

02/23/2007

  • 3:06-0040 LEWIS v. YORK COUNTY PRISON ADMINISTRATION, et al.

    The plaintiff was an alien detained by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the York County Correctional Facility pending removal. He filed the instant complaint on January 9, 2006. (Doc. No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, he received an administrative order directing him to pay the filing fee or apply to proceed in forma pauperis and an application and authorization form for use by prisoners to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 5.) Upon his returning the application and the authorization form, the court issued an administrative order pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), directing the prison warden to remit each month to the court a percentage of the filing fee from the plaintiff’s prison account. (Doc. No. 11.)

12/27/2006

  • 3:03-CV-0602 KEGOLIS v. BOROUGH OF SHENANDOAH, PENNSYLVANIA, et al.
    File:

    Plaintiff John A. Kegolis was hired as a police officer with Defendant Borough of Shenandoah (“the Borough”) in August of 1993. (Doc. 41 ¶ 2.) On or about February 9, 1999, Plaintiff was in pursuit of a fugitive when he slipped on a patch of ice and fell, striking his neck. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15; Doc. 41 ¶ 3.) As a result of this impact, Plaintiff suffered injuries to his cervical spinal column in the region of C5-C7. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to perform his regular duties as a Borough police officer until May 27, 1999, when he was restricted to sedentary duty by Myron D. Haas, D.O., Plaintiff’s treating physician.

12/18/2006

  • 3:04-CV-1920 KOSCIOLEK v. WILKES-BARRE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION LOCAL 104, et al.
    File:

    Presently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Thomas E. Kosciolek (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants City of Wilkes-Barre (the “City”), Thomas M. Leighton (“Mayor Leighton”), Jacob Lisman (“Chief Lisman”) (collectively “City Defendants”), and Wilkes-Barre Fire Fighters Local 104, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO (“Local 104") (collectively “Defendants”). (Docs. 61, 64, 71 and 76.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motions will be denied. Defendants' motions will be granted as to Count I of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The Court has jurisdiction over Count I of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court will decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over Counts II and III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and will dismiss these claims without prejudice.

  • 3:04-CV-1919 TURINSKI v. WILKES-BARRE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION LOCAL 104, et al.
    File:

    Presently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Robert Turinski (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants City of Wilkes-Barre (the “City”), Thomas M. Leighton (“Mayor Leighton”), Jacob Lisman (“Chief Lisman”) (collectively “City Defendants”), and Wilkes-Barre Fire Fighters Local 104, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO (“Local 104") (collectively “Defendants”). (Docs. 72, 75, 80 and 85.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motions will be denied. Defendants' motions will be granted as to Count I of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. The Court has jurisdiction over Count I of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court will decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over Counts II and III of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, and will dismiss these claims without prejudice.

12/06/2006

  • 3:03-CV-1966 HAAS v. WYOMING VALLEY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
    File:

    Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 66-1.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion will be denied.

    This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 13311 (“federal question”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331128 U.S.C. § 13432 (“civil rights and elective franchise”).

11/30/2006

  • 3:04-CV-0087 STATE FARM v. HILL, et al.
    File:

    Presently before the Court is Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) as to its action seeking a declaratory judgment that it is not required to provide coverage, defend or indemnify Defendant Joe Calvin Neff pursuant to Neff’s automobile insurance policy as a result of any personal injury or property damage caused by Neff on March 31, 2002. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court has jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

11/29/2006

  • 3:03-CV-1690 WALTER, et al. v. PIKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.
    File:

    Presently before the Court are three motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions will be granted in part and denied in part. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim will be denied. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim will be granted. Defendants Westfall Township, Pike County, and the Pike County District Attorney’s Office are entitled to assert the defense of municipal immunity and will be released as named defendants in this action. Defendants DeSarro and Jacobs are not entitled to absolute immunity as to their investigative roles in the elicitation of a confession from Joseph Stacy. Defendant Mitchell is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity for any of his actions taken in this case. Defendants DeSarro and Jacobs are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity as to their failure to warn the Walter family of the danger posed by Joseph Stacy in the period leading up to the murder of Michael Walter. These Defendants are not entitled to the qualified immunity defense, however, for their involvement in the elicitation of the confession from Joseph Stacy.

    This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“federal question jurisdiction” and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (“supplemental jurisdiction” over related state-law claims).

11/21/2006

  • 3:05-CV-2647 JAMES v. RICHMAN, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare
    File:

    Presently before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Robert A. James and Defendant Estelle B. Richman, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare. (Docs. 30 and 32.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, as to his request for a permanent injunction, will be granted. Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment will be denied. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

11/07/2006

  • 4:05-1906 REIFER v. COLONIAL INTERMEDIATE UNIT 20

    The plaintiff commenced this action on September 21, 2005, by filing her complaint. (Doc. No. 1.) In the complaint, the plaintiff accuses the defendant of disability-based discrimination and related offenses. She raises six counts. First, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2006)), by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability even though she would have been able to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Second, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006)), by failing to advise her of her rights under the FMLA while she was on protected leave. Third, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against her because of her exercising of her rights under the ADA and FMLA. Fourth, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (“PHRA”), Pub. L. No. 744, Pa. Laws 222 (codified as amended at 43 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 2006)), by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability even though she would have been able to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Fifth, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against her by terminating her for filing a claim under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act of 1915 (“WCA”), Pub. L. No. 736, Pa. Laws 338 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1 et seq. (West 2006)). Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA”), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)),1 by taking an adverse employment action against her because she was pregnant.

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