In this habeas corpus action, we are asked to determine the constitutionality of Petitioner Daniel Jacobs’ conviction of first degree murder and his sentence of death. The respondents are Martin Horn, Com missioner, Pennsylvania Departme nt of Corrections; Conner Blaine, Jr., Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution, Greene County; and Joseph P . Mazurkiewicz , Superinte ndent of th e State Co rrectional In stitution at Rockview. The petitioner raises a multitude of issues involving alleged errors of the trial court and ineffectiveness of counsel. With one exception, we find all of petitioner’s arguments to be either without merit or moot. However, because we find, for the reasons which follow, that the petition er’s death sentence violates the Constitutio n of the U nited State s, we will condition ally grant the petition fo r a writ of ha beas corp us.
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1:CV-99-0940 FOUST, et al. v. P.H. GLATFELTER COMPANYJudge:File:
The following facts are undisputed except where noted. Defendant, P.H. Glatfelter Company (“Glatfelter” or “Defendant”), owns and operates a pulp and paper mill in Spring Grove, York County, Pennsylvania (the “Mill”). The Mill is situated along the Codorus Creek which flows into the Susquehanna River approximately 15 miles downstream from the Mill. Defendant manufactures paper using a bleached kraft process in order to remove the brown color from the wood fiber contained in the paper.Defendant discharges approximately 14 million gallons of wastewater into the west branch of Codorus Creek daily. The bleaching agents used by Defendant cause a chemical reaction that moves the color molecules from the paper into the wastewater. Plaintiffs contend that there is a discoloration of the Codorus beginning at the mill that is visible all the way downstream through the City of York, located approximately ten miles from the Mill. Plaintiffs claim that this discoloration results from the wastewater discharged by Defendant. (Pl. Statement Undisputed Facts, hereinafter “Pl. Facts,” at ¶¶ 3, 6, 7.) Defendant disputes that any discoloration of the Codorus is caused by the color of the wastewater, that the discoloration begins at the Mill, and that Plaintiffs have established what the “true” color of the stream is. (Def. Resp. to Pl. Facts, hereinafter “Def. Resp. Facts”, at ¶¶ 3, 6, 7.)
1:CV-99-0487 CLOVERLAND-GREEN SPRING DAIRIES, INC., et al. v. PENNSYLVANIA MILK MARKETING BOARD, et al.Judge:File:
The instant action seeks a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of Pennsylvania’s Milk Marketing Law, 31 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 700j-101, et seq. (“PMML”), and certain provisions of Official General Orders A-890A and A-900, (i) violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and (ii) deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the minimum milk prices fixed pursuant to Orders A-890A and A-900.
3:98-CV-1222 WALTERS v. A & P SUPERMARKET SERVICE, et al.File:
In June 1983, the plaintiff was hired as a warehouseman for A&P. In that position, plaintiff was a member of a collective bargaining unit and was represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 229. Plaintiff first requested and was granted a medical leave of a bsence from September 13, 199 3 through November 22, 1993. Plaintiff’s Transcript (herein after “Pl. Trans.”) 81. Th e defendant stated that the plaintiff provided medical documentatio n to justify the continue d leave of absence . Id. at 83-84. Plaintiff was again granted a medical leave of absence from July 8, 1994 through October 17, 1994. Id. at 85-86. The plaintiff also provided A&P with medical documentation for that leave.In November 1995, plaintiff requested and was granted a third leave of absence after a back injury at work . Id. at 89:14-19. The plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Teig Port, restricted the plaintiff to light duty as a result of the back injury. The plaintiff informed the defendants of this restriction by providing A &P with a note from Dr. Port. However, as there was no light duty work available, Defendant A&P granted the plaintiff a leave of absence, which was approved by Dr. Port throug h July 1, 1996. Dr. Port prepared a Medical Report Form in June 1996 that authorized the plaintiff to return to his regular duties on July 1, 1996. A&P received this form and then on June 28, 1996, the plaintiff telephoned A &P to confirm that he would return to work on July 1, 1996. Id. at 103-04.
3:00CV783 TOBIN v. BADAMO, et al.File:
The facts as alleged in plaintiffs’ co mplaint are a s follows: P laintiff Sup ervisor Tobin and Defendants S krincosky and Skrobak all served to gether on the New Castle Township Board of Supervisors. Defendant Badamo was hired as a part-time police officer for New Castle Township in February 1999. Subsequently, the acting police chief resigned, leaving no one to supervise the day to day activities o f the po lice department.Defendants Skrincosky and Skrobak had developed feelings of animosity toward Supervisor Tobin and began to work against him in his efforts to better the township, in particular, his attempts to address the concerns and problems involving the police department and Defendant Badamo. They intentionally and maliciously prevented the hiring of any supervisory officer bec ause of their desire to undermine the authority of Supervisor Tobin.
3: 00 CV 1173 GUTHRIE CLINIC, LTD. v. THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF ILLINOISFile:
This case arises out of the issuance of umbrella liability insurance policies by the defendant to the plaintiff in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. The policies provided excess insurance coverage above the underlying medical malpractice coverage that plaintiff obtained through other sources.In June 1998, plaintiff was sued by Ellen Thurston. Plaintiff sent notice of the action to defendant in July of 1999. In September 1999, a declination of coverage was issued by the defendant based on the revised terms and conditions contained in the 1998 renewal policy. Plaintiff brought suit involving the defendant’s actions in the renewal of the policies and its declination of coverage with respect to the Thurston claim. Plaintiff contends that the never provided any notice of the substantial and material revisions that it unilaterally made to plaintiff’s 1998 and 1999 policies. In fact, plaintiff alleges that the defendant never ev en provided a copy of the changed excess umbrella renewal policy to plaintiff until long after the inception date of the 1998 renewal policy. Consequently, plaintiff claims to be entitled to the same insurance coverage provided to it under its 1996 and 1997 policies.
3:CV-00-0036 HUNTER v. USAJudge:File:
Plaintiff Milton Hunter (“Hunter”), formerly a federal prisoner, brought this medical malpractice suit against the United States (“the government”) on July 2, 1999. (Complaint, Doc. 1.) Hunter alleges that negligence by prison medical personnel at the Federal Correctional Institution at Schuylkill, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Schuylkill”) caused him to undergo painful urinary and urologic symptoms, humiliation, and mental anguish about the possible existence of serious untreated pathology, particularly prostate cancer. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21-22.) As Hunter’s cause of action arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, it is subject to the statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), which forever bars a tort claim against the United States unless it is presented to the appropriate federal agency within two years of its accrual.
The government asserts that Hunter has failed to comply with the two year statute of limitations, and therefore it moves for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or in the alternative for summary judgment under Rule 56.
1:CV-99-1387 BROSIOUS v. WARDEN, U.S. PENITENTIARY, LEWISBURG, PAJudge:File:
In 1990, Michael Todd Brosius, then a member of the United States Army, was charged in a military court-martial with premeditated murder under Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 918. He was convicted of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, later reduced to seventy-five years. Brosius, an inmate at USP-Lewisburg, Pennsylvania
3:96 CV 1047 GURECKI v. NORTHEAST MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C.File:
Plaintiff brought an employme nt discrimination case against the defend ant. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The defendant filed a bill of costs totaling $ 22,877.47, which it later amended to $24,346.12. Plaintiff filed objections to the defendant’s bill of costs and first amen ded bill of costs. Subsequen tly, the Clerk of Court taxed costs in the amou nt of $6,50 6.80 agains t the plaintiff. Pla intiff now appeals from this taxation of costs. In addition, the plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney’s fees and excess costs pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 1927. W e shall address these two m atters separately.
3:CV-00-0876 QWEST v. CYBER-QUEST, INC., et al.Judge:File:
Plaintiffs Qwest Communications Corporation and Qwest Communications International filed this trademark and unfair competition action on May 16, 2000, alleging that Defendants adopted the mark “Cyber-Quest” in violation of federal and state law. (Complaint, Doc.1.) This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1338(b) and 1367. On June 15, 2000, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 3.) Two arguments form the nucleus of Defendants’ motion: 1) that the dissimilarity of the marks “Qwest” and “Cyber-Quest” precludes a finding, essential to Plaintiffs’ case, that an appreciable number of consumers are likely to be confused as to the source or affiliation of Defendants’ products and services; and 2) that Plaintiffs’ federal registration of the marks “Qwest” and “Qwest Communications” extends only to the use of the marks in conjunction with the provision of “telecommunications services,” and not to their use in providing computer equipment and services. (Memorandum Supporting the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 3 at 9-12.) As Defendants’ have failed to carry their burden under the legal standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the motion to dismiss will be denied.