The Middle District of Pennsylvania offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2012, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.



    The instant action seeks a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of Pennsylvania’s Milk Marketing Law, 31 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 700j-101, et seq. (“PMML”), and certain provisions of Official General Orders A-890A and A-900, (i) violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and (ii) deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the minimum milk prices fixed pursuant to Orders A-890A and A-900.


  • 3:98-CV-1222 WALTERS v. A & P SUPERMARKET SERVICE, et al.

    In June 1983, the plaintiff was hired as a warehouseman for A&P. In that position, plaintiff was a member of a collective bargaining unit and was represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 229. Plaintiff first requested and was granted a medical leave of a bsence from September 13, 199 3 through November 22, 1993. Plaintiff’s Transcript (herein after “Pl. Trans.”) 81. Th e defendant stated that the plaintiff provided medical documentatio n to justify the continue d leave of absence . Id. at 83-84. Plaintiff was again granted a medical leave of absence from July 8, 1994 through October 17, 1994. Id. at 85-86. The plaintiff also provided A&P with medical documentation for that leave.

    In November 1995, plaintiff requested and was granted a third leave of absence after a back injury at work . Id. at 89:14-19. The plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Teig Port, restricted the plaintiff to light duty as a result of the back injury. The plaintiff informed the defendants of this restriction by providing A &P with a note from Dr. Port. However, as there was no light duty work available, Defendant A&P granted the plaintiff a leave of absence, which was approved by Dr. Port throug h July 1, 1996. Dr. Port prepared a Medical Report Form in June 1996 that authorized the plaintiff to return to his regular duties on July 1, 1996. A&P received this form and then on June 28, 1996, the plaintiff telephoned A &P to confirm that he would return to work on July 1, 1996. Id. at 103-04.


  • 3:00CV783 TOBIN v. BADAMO, et al.

    The facts as alleged in plaintiffs’ co mplaint are a s follows: P laintiff Sup ervisor Tobin and Defendants S krincosky and Skrobak all served to gether on the New Castle Township Board of Supervisors. Defendant Badamo was hired as a part-time police officer for New Castle Township in February 1999. Subsequently, the acting police chief resigned, leaving no one to supervise the day to day activities o f the po lice department.

    Defendants Skrincosky and Skrobak had developed feelings of animosity toward Supervisor Tobin and began to work against him in his efforts to better the township, in particular, his attempts to address the concerns and problems involving the police department and Defendant Badamo. They intentionally and maliciously prevented the hiring of any supervisory officer bec ause of their desire to undermine the authority of Supervisor Tobin.



    This case arises out of the issuance of umbrella liability insurance policies by the defendant to the plaintiff in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. The policies provided excess insurance coverage above the underlying medical malpractice coverage that plaintiff obtained through other sources.

    In June 1998, plaintiff was sued by Ellen Thurston. Plaintiff sent notice of the action to defendant in July of 1999. In September 1999, a declination of coverage was issued by the defendant based on the revised terms and conditions contained in the 1998 renewal policy. Plaintiff brought suit involving the defendant’s actions in the renewal of the policies and its declination of coverage with respect to the Thurston claim. Plaintiff contends that the never provided any notice of the substantial and material revisions that it unilaterally made to plaintiff’s 1998 and 1999 policies. In fact, plaintiff alleges that the defendant never ev en provided a copy of the changed excess umbrella renewal policy to plaintiff until long after the inception date of the 1998 renewal policy. Consequently, plaintiff claims to be entitled to the same insurance coverage provided to it under its 1996 and 1997 policies.


  • 3:CV-00-0036 HUNTER v. USA

    Plaintiff Milton Hunter (“Hunter”), formerly a federal prisoner, brought this medical malpractice suit against the United States (“the government”) on July 2, 1999. (Complaint, Doc. 1.) Hunter alleges that negligence by prison medical personnel at the Federal Correctional Institution at Schuylkill, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Schuylkill”) caused him to undergo painful urinary and urologic symptoms, humiliation, and mental anguish about the possible existence of serious untreated pathology, particularly prostate cancer. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21-22.) As Hunter’s cause of action arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, it is subject to the statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), which forever bars a tort claim against the United States unless it is presented to the appropriate federal agency within two years of its accrual.

    The government asserts that Hunter has failed to comply with the two year statute of limitations, and therefore it moves for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or in the alternative for summary judgment under Rule 56.



    In 1990, Michael Todd Brosius, then a member of the United States Army, was charged in a military court-martial with premeditated murder under Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 918. He was convicted of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, later reduced to seventy-five years. Brosius, an inmate at USP-Lewisburg, Pennsylvania


    Plaintiff brought an employme nt discrimination case against the defend ant. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The defendant filed a bill of costs totaling $ 22,877.47, which it later amended to $24,346.12. Plaintiff filed objections to the defendant’s bill of costs and first amen ded bill of costs. Subsequen tly, the Clerk of Court taxed costs in the amou nt of $6,50 6.80 agains t the plaintiff. Pla intiff now appeals from this taxation of costs. In addition, the plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney’s fees and excess costs pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 1927. W e shall address these two m atters separately.


  • 3:CV-00-0876 QWEST v. CYBER-QUEST, INC., et al.

    Plaintiffs Qwest Communications Corporation and Qwest Communications International filed this trademark and unfair competition action on May 16, 2000, alleging that Defendants adopted the mark “Cyber-Quest” in violation of federal and state law. (Complaint, Doc.1.) This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1338(b) and 1367. On June 15, 2000, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 3.) Two arguments form the nucleus of Defendants’ motion: 1) that the dissimilarity of the marks “Qwest” and “Cyber-Quest” precludes a finding, essential to Plaintiffs’ case, that an appreciable number of consumers are likely to be confused as to the source or affiliation of Defendants’ products and services; and 2) that Plaintiffs’ federal registration of the marks “Qwest” and “Qwest Communications” extends only to the use of the marks in conjunction with the provision of “telecommunications services,” and not to their use in providing computer equipment and services. (Memorandum Supporting the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 3 at 9-12.) As Defendants’ have failed to carry their burden under the legal standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the motion to dismiss will be denied.



    On June 5, 1997, the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when he slipped and fell at the Continental Plaza in Cancun, Mexico. The plaintiff alleges that he was a business invitee of the defendant and that he slipped and fell while crossing a foot bridge. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant was negligent, and argues that the accident occurred because of irregularities in the foot bridge and due to a lack of handrails on the bridge. Compl. ¶ 5. The defendant alleges that the defendant does no business in Pennsylvania, is not licensed to do business in Pennsylvania, has never issued a certificate of authority to do business as a foreign corporation in Pennsylvania, and does no advertising in Pennsylvania. The discovery did reveal that a Pennsylvania travel agency paid for and placed an advertisement in a Pennsylvania newspaper that mentioned the defendant.


  • 3:CV-00-1932 KOEHLER v. MARTIN HORN, et al.

    Petitioner Koehler was convicted and sentenced to death in a Pennsylvania court on two counts of first degree murder and related charges. (Motion for a Stay of Execution, Doc. 1 at 6.) On October 18, 2000, Governor Ridge signed a death warrant setting a December 7, 2000 execution date. (Doc.1 at 2.) Presently before this court are Petitioner’s motions to admit his counsel pro hac vice, (Docs. 2, 3), motion for in forma pauperis status (Doc 1), and motion for a stay of execution so that his counsel can prepare his first federal habeas corpus petition, (Doc. 1). The state has not filed a responsive brief objecting to Petitioner’s motions.