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    Plaintiff Richard Carrick filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County on November 21, 2002 against Defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co. alleging various state law claims.1 Defendant removed the action to federal court. (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for remand to state court. (Doc. 8.) The Court heard oral arguments on February 24, 2003. This matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. Because the Court finds that Defendant has not satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.


  • 3:CV-04-0283 NICKENSON LOUIS-MARTIN v. THOMAS RIDGE, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al.

    Presently before the Court is Petitioner Nickenson Louis-Martin’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief with Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. 1.) I find that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. I further find that because the Immigration Judge abused his discretion in ruling Petitioner’s Convention Against Torture claim was abandoned, Petitioner cannot be removed from the United States. I will vacate the Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remand the matter to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement for further proceedings to determine whether Mr. Louis-Martin is eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture.


  • 1:CV:02-1413 BEY v. IRS

    Before this court are: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint alleging improper taxation of his wages by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and his employer, the United States Postal Service, (2) Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary restraining order and for temporary and permanent injunctions, (3) Magistrate Judge Smyser’s Report and Recommendation concerning the motion for preliminary retraining order, (4) Plaintiff’s objections thereto, (5) Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (6) Plaintiff’s motion of refusal for fraud of respondents motion to dismiss, and (7) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court will overrule the Plaintiff’s objections to the report and recommendation, adopt the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, deny the Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.


  • 1:CV-02-2117 IPJIAN v. CONAWAY, et al.

    Plaintiffs filed suit for personal injuries resulting from a car accident in Pennsylvania on November 20, 2001. Plaintiffs brought their case in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County on October 23, 2002. Defendant Conanway filed notice of removal in this Court on November 20, 2002. Plaintiffs’ complaint established diversity of the parties and demanded damages in “an amount in excess of the compulsory arbitration limits, plus costs and interest." Following an examination of the complaint and a telephone conference with the parities, this Court remanded the action to state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction based on an inadequate amount in controversy. Following the telephone conference but before the order of remand issued, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Defendant CTS Capital Corporation, a New Jersey company. Defendants now move for reconsideration of the remand.


  • 1:CV-01-930 SCHORR v. BOROUGH OF LEMOYNE, et al.

    Plaintiffs’ decedent, Ryan K. Schorr, (“Schorr”), suffered from bipolar disorder. Schorr’s condition deteriorated shortly before November 18, 2000, and his roommate and family applied for his involuntary committal pursuant to § 302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act. A crisis intervention worker employed by Holy Spirit Hospital took and evaluated the application, and caused an order for involuntary commitment to be issued. The worker then contacted the Cumberland County Control Unit and arranged for West Shore Regional Police Department officers to detain Schorr pursuant to the commitment order and related warrant.



    Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following: Plaintiff Charles L. Emil worked as a boiler tender for UGI Electric Utilities from 1982 until May, 2001. Plaintiff was a covered beneficiary under a group long-term disability benefits policy issued by UNUM through his employer.

    Plaintiff was hospitalized between July 30 and August 8, 1996 due to the onset of angina. He underwent cardiac catheterization and ultimately a coronary arterial bypass graft surgery in 1996. Following a recovery period, Plaintiff returned to work. In May 2001, Plaintiff experienced a new on set of cardiac symptoms including angina. He underwent cardiac catheterization which revealed a lesion in the right coronary artery. He then underwent a stenting procedure. Plaintiff’s treating physicians have not yet released him to return to work.


    Plaintiff Richard T. Santasania commenced this action on July 30, 2001. (Doc. 1.) In relevant part, Plaintiff’s complaint stated that the Union Trowel Fund, through which Plaintiff had received health care benefits, improperly terminated his health care coverage effective September 1, 2000, forcing him to pay monthly premiums to keep his health care pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”). Plaintiff also claimed that Defendants improperly refused to pay medical bills incurred as a result of an auto accident in which Plaintiff was involved on August 17, 2000.


  • 3:02-CV-0831 USA v. 2001 HONDA ACCORD EX VIN #1HGCG22561A035829

    This case arises out of a civil forfeiture action brought by the United States against Defendant vehicle, a 2001 Honda Accord EX VIN #1HGCG22561A035829 (“the Honda”), for its alleged use in facilitating the transportation and sale of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), otherwise known as Ecstasy. (Doc. 1). The matter before the Court is Claimant Kimberly A. Marckesano’s (“Marckesano” or “Claimant”) Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Motion has been fully briefed by the parties. A hearing was held on this matter on January 22, 2003. The Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for disposition.

  • 3:00cr0320 USA v. SUSAN GILBRIDE

    Defendant Susan Gilbride pled guilty on December 14, 2000, to charges of Credit Card Fraud. On April 25, 2001, this court sentenced her to twelve (12) months of imprisonment, the sentence to run consecutively to a state court sentence. The court recommended that the Federal Bureau o f Prisons (hereinafter “BOP”) allow the defendant to serve her f ederal sentence at Catholic Social Services Community Contract F acility (hereinafter “CSCC”). In addition, the court imposed a three (3) year term of supervised release with special conditions requiring the payment of partial restitution of $3,471.50 and participation in counseling.

    The state paroled the defendant on July 14, 2002, and she began to serve the sentence imposed by this court. As recommended, BOP designated CSCC as the place for service of defendant’s sentence. She is scheduled to be released on July 13, 2003.



    Before the Court is a motion by Defendants Lori Dring and Nancy Asaro to stay concurrent state court proceedings concerning this matter. (Doc. 57.) In opposition, Plaintiff Ariel Land Owners, Inc. contends that Defendants removed this case in violation of the one-year time limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Therefore, Plaintiff argues, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. (Doc. 61.) The Court agrees. I lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case because § 1446(b) applies to this case and because this one-year time limitation is a jurisdictional requirement. I will remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County, Pennsylvania. Because I lack subject matter jurisdiction, all other pending motions will be denied as moot.