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11-v-2316File:William Dommel (“Dommel”) and his late father, Robert Dommel,1 participated in the commercial horse-breeding business for over twenty-five years. (Doc. 97 ¶ 7; Doc. 106 ¶ 7). Between March 2006 and May 2007, the Dommels entered into three loan agreements with Jonestown Bank and Trust Company (“the Bank”), totaling approximately $4,330,000. The documents memorializing these agreements consist of promissory notes, mortgages, and guaranties (collectively, “the loan documents”).The Dommels pledged three properties in toto as security for the loans: 1) “Farm One” located at 83 Sherk’s Church Road, Palmyra, Pennsylvania, consisting of 96 acres, (2) “Farm Two” located at 7 Coon Creek Road, Palmyra, Pennsylvania, consisting of 68 acres, and (3) a hunting camp located in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, consisting of 500 acres. According to the terms of each mortgage, the Dommels waived “all notices of Mortgagor’s default of, or Mortgagee’s election to exercise, or Mortgagee’s actual exercise of any right, remedy or option under, this Mortgage or under the Note, unless expressly required under this Mortgage or documents evidencing or collateralizing the Note.”
15-CV-5File:Hollihan v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.The putative class action at bar challenges the confidential treatment regime of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“Department”) colloquially known as the “One Good Eye” policy. Culled to its essence, this administrative policy denies cataract surgery to inmates who retain a threshold modicum of visual acuity in one eye, notwithstanding physician recommendations to the contrary. The court finds that such draconian medical treatment, as unearthed in the complaint, may transgress the Eighth Amendment.
Presently before the Court are the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment, and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Docs. 27, 29. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Plaintiffs’ motion in its entirety and grant Defendants’ motion for Summary Judgment.
Presently before the court in the above-captioned matter is the motion (Docs. 14, 17) filed by Ernesto Ruiz, Eusebia Ruiz, and Ely Felix Ruiz (collectively, "the Ruizes"), seeking the return of property and the award of attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and interest, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1). The Ruizes allege that the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") seized $20,000 in United States currency from their safe deposit box and that, following an order (Doc. 12) of court directing the return of the seized property, the government failed to relinquish $3500 of the total amount seized. For the reasons that follow, the court will deny the motion in its entirety.
The case at bar presents a constitutional challenge to a state statute. The disputed enactment creates a right of action to enjoin the expressive conduct of violent criminals that causes mental anguish to victims or their families. Significantly, however, the fact that certain plaintiffs have been convicted of infamous or violent crimes is largely irrelevant to our First Amendment analysis. A past criminal offense does not extinguish the offender‟s constitutional right to free expression. The First Amendment does not evanesce at the prison gate, and its enduring guarantee of freedom of speech subsumes the right to expressive conduct that some may find offensive.
13-cv-2022File:This matter involves an apparently novel legal question arising at the intersection of a student’s right to a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and a correctional institution’s legitimate interest in security and prison management. Specifically, we are tasked to interpret the strictures of 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B), which allows certain incarcerated students’ Individualized Education Programs to be modified where the state proves a bona fide security interest that cannot otherwise be accommodated. The action is before us on the parties’ cross motions for judgment on the supplemented administrative record. (Docs. 36, 38).
14-cv-1138File:On February 18, 2015, Storm, et al. v. Paytime, Inc. and Holt, et al. v. Paytime, Inc. were consolidated into one case for the remainder of the proceedings between the parties. (Storm, Doc. 46). However, due to the fact that these cases were filed separately and have had filings and motions pending in separate dockets, we will discuss their procedural histories separately.
Pennsylvania legislature entitled the Pennsylvania Institution of Higher Education Monetary Penalty Endowment Act (“the Endowment Act,” or “the Act”) and seeks an order of this Court enjoining the law’s enforcement. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants State Treasurer Rob McCord and Commission on Crime and Delinquency Chairman Mark Zimmer, each in his official capacity, have defended the law’s constitutionality.1 (Doc. Nos. 48, 49.) In their cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants urge the Court to decline Plaintiff’s constitutional challenge based on the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. (Doc. No. 74.) The factual predicate for this lawsuit is by now familiar, so the Court will recount only those facts with particular relevance to the present motions.
1:14-cv-00413File:This case concerns the Defendant-employer’s allegedly wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s employment as a supervisor of home care providers. (Doc. No. 5 at 1-2.) Plaintiff began working for Defendant on August 22, 2011. (Id. at 2.) Defendant is a group of non-profit organizations that provide services for individuals with disabilities. (Id. at 1-2.) In August of 2012, Plaintiff reported what she believed to be violations of various state occupation and safety laws to responsible employees of the Defendant. (Id. at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated: (1) the Pennsylvania General Safety Law, 43 Pa. Stat. § 25-2; (2) the Pennsylvania Fire and Panic Act, 34 Pa. Stat. § 50.24(e); and (3) the Pennsylvania Universal Accessibility Law, 34 Pa. Code § 60.33. (Id. at 5.)
On April 12, 2012, NXP filed a complaint in this Court, alleging that BlackBerry had infringed six of their U.S. patents. (Doc. No. 1.) After receiving Defendants’ invalidity contentions, Plaintiff conceded its claim pertaining to U.S. Patent No. 5,763,955 (“‘955 patent”). Plaintiff subsequently submitted an amended complaint, reducing its asserted patents to five (“patents-in-suit”): No. 6,501,420 (“‘420 patent”), No. 6,434,654 (“‘654 patent”), No. 7,330,455 (“‘455 patent”), No. 5,597, 668 (“‘668 patent”), and No. 5,639,697 (“‘697 patent”). (Doc. No. 97.)