This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39) of defendants Northeast Utilities (“NU”), NU Enterprises, Select Energy (“Select”, and Northeast Generations Services (“NGS”), which seeks dismissal of plaintiff Michael Campion’s claim under the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) on the grounds that it is barred by the statute of limitations and that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Campion’s claim is not time-barred, but that he has indeed failed to state a claim. Therefore, the motion will be granted, and this action will be dismissed.
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Judge John E. Jones III
Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”). (Rec. Doc. 11). For the following reasons, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 46) of defendant State Farm Insurance Company (“State Farm”). For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
This patent dispute is before the Court on two motions: the Motion to Place the Second Amended Answer and Counterclaims on File (Doc. 91) of the defendant RB Rubber Products, Inc. (“RB Rubber”) and the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (Doc. 85) of the plaintiff Dodge-Regupol, Inc. (“DRI”). For the reasons set forth below, RB Rubber’s motion will be granted, and the second amended answer and counterclaims will be docketed. However, DRI’s motion will also be granted, and this case will be dismissed.1
Judge Malachy E. Mannion
Pending before the Court is a complaint, Doc. No. 1, brought by the United States on behalf of the government of Canada. The Complaint seeks the extradition of Mary Beth Harshbarger from the United States to Canada. However, at this juncture, the complaint specifically seeks interim relief, viz., "a warrant ... pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184, for the arrest of Mary Beth Harshbarger; that she [may] be brought before this Court and that evidence of [alleged] criminality [be] heard" in order to determine her extraditability. Doc. No. 1 at 2 (quoting prayer for relief). Having examined the government's ex parte complaint and submission, the United States-Canada extradition treaty and subsequent protocols, and statutory authority, the Court has determined that a warrant for arrest is not necessary, and, in lieu thereof, the Court will order a summons to be issued and served by the United States Marshall.
The above-captioned actions are brought pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-01 to -9.3. Plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in a fraudulent real estate scheme to sell homes in excess of market value in the Pocono Mountains region of Monroe County, Pennsylvania. Presently before the court is the motion for reconsideration (Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1182, Doc. 422; Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-0832, Doc. 285) of the memorandum and order of court (Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1182, Doc. 420; Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-0832, Doc. 283)2 dated March 21, 2008, which denied the partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. 360) of defendants Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation (“Chase”) and William Spaner (collectively hereinafter “the Chase defendants”). The UTPCPL claims are not subject to the pending motion. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.
Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner
Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 86) to exclude portions of the deposition of Dr. Robert Brumback (“Dr. Brumback”) at trial.1 Dr. Brumback is a treating physician of plaintiff Douglas Trout (“Trout”) who assisted Trout with acquisition and fitting of a prosthetic leg following limb amputation. Dr. Brumback began treating Trout approximately two months following the allegedly negligent surgical procedure performed by defendant Dr. Reza Miraliakbari and the allegedly negligent treatment that Trout received at defendant Milton S. Hershey Medical Center (hereinafter “the Medical Center”). Dr. Brumback played no role in Trout’s treatment while he was under the care of defendants.
Plaintiffs object to portions of Dr. Brumback’s deposition pertaining to a patient’s treatment and recovery following a limb salvage procedure, to Trout’s ability to remodel his townhouse following injury, to Dr. Brumback’s opinion regarding the medical qualifications of defendants’ expert witness, and to Dr. Brumback’s lack of knowledge regarding medical records maintained by the Medical Center. The court will address these objections seriatim.
Presently before the court is the motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) the complaint of pro se plaintiff John D. Wilson (“Wilson”), who alleges that defendants, who are members of or counsel to the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, discriminated against him on the basis of his race and religion. Wilson, an African American and member of the Jewish faith, claims that defendants revoked his parole when he failed to complete a required substance abuse rehabilitation program, which required participants to recite a Christian prayer. Wilson refused to participate in this element of the program. Defendants contend that Wilson’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and by the favorable termination rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) will be granted.
Presently before the court are motions to dismiss the indictments in two separate criminal actions, namely, United States v. Paul Shenandoah and United States v. Brian Dennis Douglas. (See No. 07-500, Doc. 22; No. 08-196, Doc. 20.) The motions challenge the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) both on its face and as applied. The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.
For purposes of judicial economy, the court will address both motions in a single memorandum. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be denied.
Judge Yvette Kane
On April 24, 2003, the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) approved Members First Credit Union’s request to amend its credit-union charter to cover six counties in south-central Pennsylvania. In doing so, the NCUA determined that the six-county area, which covers over 3,000 square miles and has a population of more than 1.2 million people, constitutes a “well-defined local community.” Plaintiffs, led by the American Bankers Association (“Association”),1 maintain that the area does not constitute a well-defined local community. Accordingly, the Association brought suit against the NCUA to challenge the NCUA’s approval pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Members First Credit Union and two other affected credit unions intervened as defendants.