Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Farmers New Century Insurance Company (“Farmers”) and Defendant J.V. Defendants John Angerson and C.L.A. also filed a motion for summary judgment, joining J.V.’s motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Farmers’ motion (Doc. 30) and grant the Defendants’ motions. (Docs. 23, 32.)
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Judge John E. Jones III
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Westport Insurance Corporation (“Plaintiff” or “Westport”) and Defendants Raymond A. Diehl and Genevieve A. Diehl (“Defendants” or “the Diehls”). These motions have been fully briefed, and the Court has heard oral argument on the issues raised therein. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Westport’s motion (Doc. 50) and deny the Diehls’ motion (Doc. 55).
Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner
Presently before the court is the motion (Doc. 12) of defendant National RV (“National”)1 for summary judgment on the claims of plaintiff Daniel Woolums (“Woolums”) for alleged violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312; the warranty provisions of Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, 13 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2313-2316; and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 to 201-9.3. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
This is a civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiff Keon Brice (“Brice”) against defendants City of York and five of its police officers. Brice alleges that the actions of the officers while arresting him violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from excessive force and state-created danger. Presently before the court is the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. The motion seeks summary judgment on Brice’s municipal liability claims and on the state-created danger claim against the individual officers. One of the officers has also moved for summary judgment on the excessive force claim based upon his participation in the arrest. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted with respect to all of these claims.
Presently before the court is the motion (Doc. 18) of defendant Rashi Abdul Ushery to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of the vehicle he was operating on June 24, 2007. The court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion on November 29, 2007, after which the parties filed supplemental briefs in support of their respective positions. (See Doc. 28 at 1; see also Docs. 30, 31.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.
Presently before the court is defendant’s motion to suppress (Doc. 29) all evidence seized pursuant to a warrant executed on March 5, 2007, in connection with a police investigation of defendant’s brother, Randell Jackson. The court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion on August 27, 2007 and a supplemental hearing on September 7, 2007. (See Docs. 44, 46.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.
Judge Yvette Kane
On December 8, 2005, Defendants Terrance Williams and Eric Hayes and fourteen other individuals were named in a thirty-two count indictment alleging a multi-year, nationwide conspiracy to engage in the interstate sex trafficking of women, including juveniles. The indictment also separately charged Defendants with other related crimes.1 As part of its case-in-chief, the Government proposes to call Dr. Sharon W. Cooper as an expert witness to offer opinion testimony in three general areas: (1) the societal and criminal justice implications of prostitution and the sexual exploitation of women; (2) the medical and mental-health aspects of prostitution, including general testimony on victim risk and vulnerability factors and on common methods of grooming and deterrents to escape; (3) and the medical and mental-health impact that life as a prostitute had on certain women involved in this case. (Doc. No. 983; see also Doc. Nos. 949, 949-3.)
Before the Court is an action under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., challenging an administrative order of the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”). The parties have extensively briefed two issues now before the Court for determination: (1) the standard of review the Court should apply when considering the NCUA’s decision; and (2) the proper scope of discovery. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that: (1) the challenged action of the NCUA must be reviewed on the merits under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of § 706(2)(A) and for procedural errors under § 706(2)(D) of the APA; and (2) that the agency’s action must be evaluated based on the administrative record before the Court.
Beginning in 1996, Plaintiff Sherry Wampler worked for the Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Wampler suffers from sleep-related medical issues, IgA deficiency,1 asthma, and susceptibility to upper respiratory infections. (Compl. ¶ 7.) On March 27, 1998, Wampler submitted a written request for a modified work schedule to accommodate sleep-related medical issues. (Compl. ¶ 4.) In addition, Wampler took sick leave due to her illnesses. In her complaint, Wampler alleges that Defendant criticized her, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for taking sick leave. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-10.) Additionally, Wampler alleges that her employment was terminated on February 9, 2006, “for allegedly leaving work early and taking extended lunches.”
Judge Malachy E. Mannion
Felipe Cordova-Lopez is a foreign national subject to deportation to Mexico. On August 8, 2007, this court ordered Felipe Cordova-Lopez to be detained for twenty days as a material witness for the United States. The United States sought Mr. Cordova-Lopez’s testimony in the prosecution against a defendant who was charged with immigration offenses. However, on August 28, 2007, this court dismissed the material witness warrant against Mr. Cordova-Lopez because the defendant entered a guilty plea. As a result, there was no trial and Mr. Cordova-Lopez was never called to testify as a material witness.
On August 20, 2007, Mr. Cordova-Lopez filed the instant motion for material witness fees, arguing that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) he should be compensated $40 for each day he was detained. (Doc. No. 39). The United States filed its opposition brief on August 30, 2007. (Doc. No. 52). Mr. Cordova-Lopez then filed a brief in support of his motion on August 31, 2007. (Doc. No. 53).