On March 5, 2015, Plaintiffs Michael L. Keyes, (“Mr. Keyes”), and Jonathan K. Yox, (“Mr. Yox”), filed a Complaint, alleging violations of their asserted Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. (Doc. 1). Count I of the Complaint contends that, as applied to Plaintiffs, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) violates the Second Amendment. Count II alleges that, as applied to Mr. Yox, § 922(g)(4) violates the Second Amendment because Mr. Yox was under the age of 18 when he was involuntarily committed. Count III alleges that § 922(g)(4) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to Plaintiffs. Lastly, Count IV alleges that § 922(g)(4) violates Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights secured under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs seek various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief.
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Judge John E. Jones III
Before the Court is a motion by Plaintiffs, Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants, Penn State Hershey Medical Center (“Hershey”) and PinnacleHealth System (“Pinnacle”) (collectively, “the Hospitals”), from taking any steps towards consummating their proposed merger pending the completion of the FTC’s administrative trial on the merits of the underlying antitrust claims.
R.L., a minor, by and through his parents, Michael Lordan and Jill Lordan, commenced this action by filing a Complaint on March 11, 2014, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First Amendment free speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Doc. 1). The Complaint also includes a state law claim for violation of R.L.’s free speech rights under the Pennsylvania Code.
Pending before the Court are cross-motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Nationwide Insurance Company (“Nationwide” or “Plaintiff”) and by Defendants Sharon and Charles P. Chiao (“Defendants”). (Rec. Docs. 10 and 13). Following briefing by the parties, we held oral argument on the Motions on May 13, 2005. The Motions are now ripe for our review. Diversity jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1332.
For the following reasons, we will grant the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
On February 18, 2015, Storm, et al. v. Paytime, Inc. and Holt, et al. v. Paytime, Inc. were consolidated into one case for the remainder of the proceedings between the parties. (Storm, Doc. 46). However, due to the fact that these cases were filed separately and have had filings and motions pending in separate dockets, we will discuss their procedural histories separately.
Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner
Capitol Presort Services, LLC (“Capitol Presort”) commenced this breach of contract action against XL Health Corporation (“XL Health”) asserting that XL Health unilaterally terminated a service agreement between the parties prior to the expiration of its initial term. Before the court are the parties’ respective cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
William Dommel (“Dommel”) and his late father, Robert Dommel,1 participated in the commercial horse-breeding business for over twenty-five years. (Doc. 97 ¶ 7; Doc. 106 ¶ 7). Between March 2006 and May 2007, the Dommels entered into three loan agreements with Jonestown Bank and Trust Company (“the Bank”), totaling approximately $4,330,000. The documents memorializing these agreements consist of promissory notes, mortgages, and guaranties (collectively, “the loan documents”).
The Dommels pledged three properties in toto as security for the loans: 1) “Farm One” located at 83 Sherk’s Church Road, Palmyra, Pennsylvania, consisting of 96 acres, (2) “Farm Two” located at 7 Coon Creek Road, Palmyra, Pennsylvania, consisting of 68 acres, and (3) a hunting camp located in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, consisting of 500 acres. According to the terms of each mortgage, the Dommels waived “all notices of Mortgagor’s default of, or Mortgagee’s election to exercise, or Mortgagee’s actual exercise of any right, remedy or option under, this Mortgage or under the Note, unless expressly required under this Mortgage or documents evidencing or collateralizing the Note.”
The putative class action at bar challenges the confidential treatment regime of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“Department”) colloquially known as the “One Good Eye” policy. Culled to its essence, this administrative policy denies cataract surgery to inmates who retain a threshold modicum of visual acuity in one eye, notwithstanding physician recommendations to the contrary. The court finds that such draconian medical treatment, as unearthed in the complaint, may transgress the Eighth Amendment.
Presently before the court in the above-captioned matter is the motion (Docs. 14, 17) filed by Ernesto Ruiz, Eusebia Ruiz, and Ely Felix Ruiz (collectively, "the Ruizes"), seeking the return of property and the award of attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and interest, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1). The Ruizes allege that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized $20,000 in United States currency from their safe deposit box and that, following an order (Doc. 12) of court directing the return of the seized property, the government failed to relinquish $3500 of the total amount seized. For the reasons that follow, the court will deny the motion in its entirety.
The case at bar presents a constitutional challenge to a state statute. The disputed enactment creates a right of action to enjoin the expressive conduct of violent criminals that causes mental anguish to victims or their families. Significantly, however, the fact that certain plaintiffs have been convicted of infamous or violent crimes is largely irrelevant to our First Amendment analysis. A past criminal offense does not extinguish the offender‟s constitutional right to free expression. The First Amendment does not evanesce at the prison gate, and its enduring guarantee of freedom of speech subsumes the right to expressive conduct that some may find offensive.