Plaintiff alleges that SSB “failed to ensure that the analysis provided to its millions of retail brokerage customers would not be influenced by its investment banking operations.” Compl. ¶ 24. Contrary to SSB’s marketing and contractual obligations to its consumer clients, plaintiff alleges that SSB’s research and analysis was not objective, but rather a tool for the benefit of its investment banking business. Id. As a result, plaintiff contends that SSB charged its consumer clients a premium for providing a valuable product: objective analysis, but it actually provided them with another, valueless product: biased research. Compl. ¶¶ 47-51.
The Middle District of Pennsylvania offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2012, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
3:02cv2014 ROWINSKI v. SALOMON SMITH BARNEY, INC.Judge:File:
1: CV-03-1481 COUNTESS v. POOL FACT, INC.File:
According to Plaintiff’s complaint, on December 7, 2001, Commerce Bank (“Commerce”) lent PoolPak, Inc. (“PoolPak”) $250,000. On December 24, 2001, Commerce lent PoolPak an additional $250,000. In exchange for these loans totaling $500,000, Commerce held a security interest in any and all outstanding accounts receivable due to PoolPak. On June 6, 2003, Commerce assigned its interest in PoolPak’s accounts receivable to Plaintiffs Frank H. and Rebecca K. Countess. Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to recover $470,806.00 from Defendant Pool Fact, Inc. for goods PoolPak delivered to Defendant, for which Defendant refused to pay.
1:CV-02-1500 CLARENDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. CITY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIAFile:
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by Plaintiff Clarendon National Insurance Company against the City of York, Pennsylvania to disclaim coverage for the civil action against the City and several York police officers filed in this Court and docketed as civil action number 03-169 (the “underlying action” or the “Allen case”).Charles Robertson, then mayor of York, signed an application for insurance on May 26, 2000. (Doc. No. 23, Ex. I, attach. B). A supplemental application was signed on July 17, 2000. Based on these applications, Plaintiff issued the City public officials and employment practices liability insurance (Policy No. APR 15-00123), effective August 19, 2000 through August 19, 2001, in return for a policy premium of $23,243.
4:CV-03-1184 CANALES-MARTINEZ v. THOMAS RIDGE, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al.Judge:File:
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Jose Cristobal Canales-Martinez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus requesting a stay of removal and challenging the removal order. I will deny Petitioner’s petition. I find that Petitioner was never eligible for INA § 212(c) relief, thus there can be no impermissible retroactive effect under INS v. St. Cyr. I also find that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is not precluded from initiating INA § 238 removal proceedings while an INA § 240 removal proceeding is pending because the bases for removal under each section are independent from one another. The Court has jurisdiction to decide this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
3:00cv1142 BROMINSKI v. COUNTY OF LUZERNE, et al.File:
In August 1992, Luzerne County hired the plaintiff to serve as its Chief Clerk of Assessment. Complaint ¶ 12. During his employment, plaintiff supervised 40-50 employees in the County’s Tax Assessor’s office. See Defendants’ Exhib. 3, p. 22-23. In December 1999, as part of its annual budgeting process, the County finalized the 2000 fiscal year budget. See id. Exhib. 1B. In order to meet the parameters of the budget and the total amount of salaries that were allowed, the county realigned certain departments and eliminated certain positions from the budget, including three (3) full-time positions in the County Assessor’s office. See id. Exhib. 2. After the budget was adopted on December 30, 1999, the plaintiff was notified of the elimination of his position and his termination. See id. Exhib. 3, p. 36.In January 1999, plaintiff announced his candidacy and sought the democratic nomination for the office of County Commissioner of Luzerne County. Complaint ¶ 14. Plaintiff was unsuccessful in his campaign for County Commissioner. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff claims that he was terminated from his position in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 21.
1:03-CR-129 USA v. LYNCHFile:
Defendant has moved to suppress all of the evidence seized and to suppress his identification by the officers as “tainted.” Defendant argues (1) it was unreasonable for Officer Fry to stop Defendant’s vehicle, (2) the officers’ identification of Defendant as the driver of the vehicle was unnecessarily suggestive and therefore unreliable, (3) the search of Defendant’s vehicle and the seizure of its contents were unlawful and not justified under the inventory or plain view exceptions.
3:01cv1998 RADER v. WEA MANUFACTURING, INC.File:
On January 18, 1993, WEA Manufacturing, Inc. (“WEA”) hired plaintiff as a full-time Mechanical Designer in its Research and Development (“R&D”) Department. Complaint ¶ 6. Plaintiff was fifty-three years of age at the time he was hired. Id. ¶ 5-6. WEA operates a manufacturing facility that produces various multimedia products, including Compact Discs (“CDs”), information CDs (“CD-ROMs”) and Digital Versatile Discs (“DVDs”). Jeffrey Raider Aff. ¶ 3.On December 13, 2000, plaintiff was informed that the Machine and Mold Shop (“the Shop”) was going to be eliminated and all part fabrication would be outsourced. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff was also informed that, since his position was part of this department, he would be terminated. Id. ¶ 27. On April 10, 2001, at the age of sixty-one, plaintiff was terminated. Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiff claims that the functions of his position were still required and were distributed among several other employees who were not as qualified or experienced. Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff also claims that all of the other younger Shop employees and their supervisor were not terminated. Id. ¶ 6.
1:CV-99-854 SHELLEM v. MAYS, et al.File:
Plaintiffs’ civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants argue that this 1983 civil rights action must be dismissed on two bases: (1) that the undisputed facts do not demonstrate violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that even assuming that Plaintiffs have established violation of a protected right, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be denied.
3:02cv44 STONE v. DISABILITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, et al.File:
In March 2000, plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Id. at ¶ 8. As a result, plaintiff has cut back on his work by 50 %. Id. Sometime after plaintiff became ill, he filed a claim with Defendant Equitable. Defendant Disability Management Services (“DMS”), a third party administrator for Equitable, began payment on plaintiff ’s claim in April 2000. Id. at ¶ 10. On April 13, 2001, DMS began payments under a different calculation system, which takes into account his ownership share in the business in calculating his “monthly earnings.” Id. at ¶ 11, Exhibits B and C. In applying this system, DMS has reduced the monthly payments it makes to plaintiff in proportion to losses that the business has been facing . Id. Plaintiff disagrees with the method of benefit calculation and therefore filed the present suit. Id. at ¶ 12.
1:CV-03-693 CRAWFORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al.File:
This action arises out of the events surrounding the investigation and trial of Plaintiff, Steven Crawford, for the 1970 murder of John Eddie Mitchell. In 1974, at the age of fourteen, Plaintiff was charged with the crime. He was found guilty by three different juries in 1974, 1977, and 1978, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Plaintiff was released from prison after twenty-eight years, on July 16, 2002, upon the discovery of exculpatory evidence during the course of Plaintiff’s habeas proceedings.