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The Middle District of Pennsylvania offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Judge Matthew W. Brann

On April 25, 2012, plaintiff Violet Gallagher (hereinafter, “Gallagher”) filed a complaint against defendant East Buffalo Township (hereinafter, the “Township”) seeking relief for alleged violations of the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., Pennsylvania’s Clean Streams Law, 35 P.S. § 691.1, et seq., and Pennsylvania’s Stormwater Management Act, 32 P.S. § 680.1, et seq., as well as for common law nuisance and trespass.

In 2005, the plaintiffs, property owners in Sullivan County, Pennsylvania, became lessors pursuant to oil-and-gas leases with counterparty-lessee Chief. (Def.’s Facts, May 4, 2012 ¶¶ 1-4). The Roe plaintiffs’s lease with Chief commenced October 28, 2005; both of the Beinlich plaintiffs’s leases commenced days earlier on October 25, 2005. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4). The leases provide Chief exclusive rights to “all the oil, gas, and coalbed methane and their constituents . . . underlying the [land leased by the plaintiffs], together with such exclusive rights as may be necessary or convenient for [Chief] . . . to explore for, develop, produce, measure, and market production from [the land leased by plaintiffs]."

Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se in this collective action for unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), 43 P.S. §§ 333.101, et seq, commenced this litigation on April 17, 2012. Compl., ECF No. 1. The parties seek court approval of a proposed settlement agreement.

On March 1, 2012, plaintiff, Rox-Ann Reifer (hereinafter “Reifer”), as assignee of Donald Russo, Esquire, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. On March 23, 2012, defendant, Westport Insurance Corporation (hereinafter “Westport”) removed the case to the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner

This action is one of seventeen initiated by the Attorneys General of several states and the District of Columbia against defendants McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (“McGraw Hill”), and Standard & Poor’s Financial Services, LLC (“S&P”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged violations of state consumer protection and unfair trade practices laws.

Judge James M. Munley

Plaintiffs Stanley and Marisol Laskowski initiated this action against the United States of America Department of Veterans Affairs for damages pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. The plaintiffs allege medical malpractice against the medical professionals and administrative staff at the Wilkes-Barre Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“WBVAMC”) located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs assert that the United States of America Department of Veteran Affairs committed professional negligence in treating Plaintiff Stanley Laskowski for post traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter “PTSD”) at the WBVAMC. Plaintiff Marisol Laskowski, Stanley Laskowski’s wife, has asserted a claim for loss of consortium.

Judge John E. Jones III

Presently pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Statutory Bad Faith and UTPCPL Claims Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Doc. 65) of Defendant Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company. For the reasons fully articulated herein, we will deny the Motion in its entirety.

Presently pending before the Court in this wrongful death and survival action is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 220) and the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 252) of Defendant AVCO Corporation on behalf of its Lycoming Engines Division (collectively “Lycoming”). The Motions have been fully briefed (Docs. 223, 235, 249, 257, 269, 276, 292, 296) and are therefore ripe for our review. For all of the reasons fully articulated herein, we will grant in part and deny in part Lycoming’s Motions.

The case sub judice involves The Harrisburg Authorities’ (“THA”) project to upgrade and modernize the Harrisburg Materials, Energy, Recycling and Recovery Facility, a trash-to-steam waste treatment facility (“the incinerator”). (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 1, 10). To finance the incinerator project, THA issued a series of bonds, including its Guaranteed Resource Recovery Facility Revenue Bonds, Series D of 2003 (the “2003D Bonds”), Guaranteed Federally Taxable Resource Recovery Facility Revenue Bonds, Series E of 2003 (the “2003E Bonds”), and Guaranteed Federally Taxable Resource Recovery Facility Revenue Bonds, Series F of 2003 (the “2003F Bonds”), under a Trust Indenture dated December 1, 2003 (the “Retrofit Indenture”) between THA and Commerce Bank/Pennsylvania, National Association. (Id. ¶ 11). Dauphin County (“Dauphin” or the “County”), recognizing the countywide benefits of the project and its responsibilities for municipal waste planning, entered into agreements with THA to provide secondary guarantees for the 2003D Bonds and 2003E Bonds, for a total amount not to exceed $110,980,000. (Id. ¶ 12).

THA contracted with Barlow Projects, Inc. (“Barlow”) to design the incinerator, retrofit the facility, and provide state-of-the-art “Combustion Technology.” (Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.) The agreement between THA and Barlow was memorialized in three separate contracts in May 2004. In the “Equipment Contract,” THA agreed to pay almost $52 million for the proprietary and other specialized equipment necessary to retrofit the incinerator. (See id. ¶ 18(I)). In the “Services Contract,” THA agreed to pay almost $13 million to Barlow for engineering, construction, and start-up of the incinerator. (See id. ¶ 18(II)). Finally, in the “Sublicensing Agreement,” THA purchased a nonexclusive license for the use Barlow’s proprietary Combustion Technology which was to be installed in the incinerator. (See id. ¶ 18(III)).

The retrofit of the incinerator was originally scheduled to be completed in twenty-four months, and the facility was to be restarted in late 2005. (See id. ¶ 21). This was not to be.

Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 117), Plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment, (doc. 137), and Defendants’ Motion to Strike. (Doc. 163). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment shall be granted in part and denied in part, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants’ motion to strike shall be denied.

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